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UNSETTLED EXPECTATIONS:
REFLECTIONS ON FOUR VIEWS OF THE
COMMON LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT
David Schoenbrodt
INTRODUCTION
Why bother to consider common law solutions to environmental
problems? Is it just a way of wishing there were no environmental
law? If you think that, see Mountain Patrol: Kekexili, an award
winning film distributed by National Geographic. National
Geographic is not known as a champion of common law solutions,'
yet the film suggests why some scholars do wish for them. Some
wishes, of course, can't be realized. This symposium is about whether
this wish in particular can be, but more on that later.
The film dramatizes the effort in the 1990s to save the Tibetan
antelope, native to the 3-mile high Kekexili region of the Qinghai-
Tibetan Plateau and now endangered. The threat to the antelope came
from poachers who machine gunned whole herds, stripped the hides,
and left the carcasses for the birds. The hides were in demand because
the antelopes' wool was used, illegally, to make luxurious
"shahtoosh" scarves. The poaching had reduced the antelope
population from millions to only ten thousand or so and poachers
were still killing hundreds in a burst.
t Trustee Professor, New York Law School and Senior Fellow, Cato Institute Visiting
Scholar, American Enterprise Institute. My thanks to Jonathan Adler, Andrew Morriss, and
Katrina Wyman for helpful suggestions. Wen Yan Schieffelin, New York Law School Class of
2008, provided excellent research assistance.
I National Geographic website, http://www.nationalgeographic.com (last visited Feb. 4,
2008) (A search of the website for "common law" yielded no results).
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The right to stop the slaughter was with the People's Republic of
China, which claimed to own the antelope as surely as it claimed to
own Tibet. No individual or Tibetan tribe had a right to the animals.
Nonetheless, a small, rag-tag group of Tibetans from the locale
banded together to stop the poachers. The group, led by a middle-
aged man, Ri Tai, received some support from the Chinese
government but nothing like the rights of an owner. The patrol was
empowered to confiscate antelope hides and levy fines, both to be
turned over to the government, but not to arrest anyone. The
government gave the patrol a subsidy, but it was not enough. At the
point the film opens, a patrolman had just been killed by the poachers
and the surviving patrolmen had received no salary for a year.
After mourning their colleague, Ri Tai and his colleagues set out
to pursue the poachers. At a lakeside, the patrol came across the
carcasses of several hundred freshly killed and skinned antelope. The
patrol buried the carcasses with the same reverence that it had
mourned its murdered colleague (it buried many thousand antelope a
year) and followed the tracks of the poachers. They found some
poachers, but they were small fry. The top culprit-the man who
triggers the machine gun and pockets the big money-had gone on.
Having sought him for years, Ri Tai gave chase. The remaining
poachers, however, took cover, fired at the patrol as it passed, killing
one of its members and wounding another, and took off again. To
continue the chase, Ri Tai ordered one of his men to take the
wounded patrolman to the doctor and return with needed supplies.
There was, however, a problem-insufficient funds. So Ri Tai
ordered some hides seized from the poachers to be sold on the black
market. This was illegal, but it was break the law or let the killers get
away.
As the chase continues, Ri Tai had to leave more colleagues and
equipment behind because, lacking funds, gas was in short supply,
vehicles were dicey, and members of the patrol were few. By the time
he caught up with the villain, Ri Tai was down to one sidekick and
only a dozen bullets. Ri Tai found himself confronted with the villain
who was armed with his machine gun and backed up by his gang.
This is, where, in a Western, John Wayne would do something
astounding and heroic. But, this is, to recoin a phrase, an "Adult
Eastern." Ri Tai, the hunter, was snared. The villain asked, "Why
have you tried to stop me for all these years?" Ri Tai responded,
"They are my antelope." Without hope, Ri Tai took a swing at the
villain and was shot dead.
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The film states that it is "inspired" by events and the National
Geographic website suggests the same.2 The extent to which the
docu-drama is drama rather than "docu" I do not know. As is the way
with docu-dramas, however, the film ends with text describing the
aftermath.3 Due to the publicity generated by the mountain patrol, the
Chinese government has made Kekexili a preserve, the level of
poaching has been reduced (there is no claim that it is eliminated),
and the antelope population has increased to a hundred thousand.4
This summary fails to do justice to the film. It is worth watching
for any of the following: the scenery, the elan of the patrol, and the
acting, mostly done by locals without prior dramatic experience.
Equally electric is the "production diary" at the National Geographic
website.5 Read that too.
Now, what the film suggests about the common law. To Ri Tai,
they were "my antelope," but to the law they were not. If they were
his antelope or those of some small tribe, he would have had plenty of
bullets, gas, and sidekicks. He could have sold enough antelope hides
to fund a powerful anti-poaching patrol without putting a dent in the
herd. He could have given jobs to the underling poachers, who work
for the big villain because, as they said, that was the only livelihood
open to them in the bleak uplands of Kekexili. A favorite topic in the
common law of the environment literature is how giving individuals
or tribes ownership interests has, by giving the locals a stake in the
preservation of the animals, been a more effective shield against
poaching than enforcement by remote national governments.
6
The most evident moral to be taken from Mountain Patrol.
Kekexili is that when individuals or small groups own resources, they
have a strong incentive to spend to protect the resource while, in
contrast, when government's own resources, they may or may not do
so. In the United States, the federal government's slothful stewardship
of federal grazing lands suggests that government property can, like
property owned in common, be subject to a tragedy of the commons.
Property ownership by individuals or small groups can sometimes
2 National Geographic, Mountain Patrol, http://www.nationalgeographic.com/
mountainpatrol/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2008).
3 Mountain Patrol (Kekelixi) (Sony Pictures 2004).
4 Id.
5 National Geographic, Mountain Patrol-Production Diary, http://www.national
geographic.com/mountainpatrol/prod diary.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2008).
6 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Do Conservation Conventions Conserve?, in
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PROMOTING PROGRESS OR PERPETUATING POVERTY, (Julian
Morris ed., Profile Books 2002), available at http://www.sdnetwork.net/pdfs/jonathanadler
chapteri 1.pdf.
7 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243-48 (1968).
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protect the environment by hitching the wagon of environmental
protection to the horse of self-interest.
There is another, slightly more subtle, moral lurking in the movie.
If they really were Ri Tai's antelope, he would not have to depend
upon the shifting whims of officials in power to protect them. Ri Tai
would have the rule of law rather than the caprice of officials.
Modem environmentalists understand the rule of law point. That is
why modem environmental statutes bottom, or at least give the
appearance of bottoming, environmental protection upon
nondiscretionary duties backed up by the right of citizens to bring
suits to make officials carry out these duties, such as promulgating
regulations, and to bring enforcement actions against polluters that
violate regulations.
Yet, in purporting to place environmental protection under the rule
of law rather than the caprice of officials, modem environmental
statutes deviate from the spirit of the common law in other ways. The
common law sought to prescribe conduct that society deems unjust.
That is, as Oliver Wendell Holmes put it, "the first requirement of a
sound body of law."
8
The common law system was structured to serve this noble
aspiration. Judges were to have no stake in the outcome of the cases.
They were required to ground their decisions in precedent whose
ultimate source was custom. They would announce the law in specific
controversies. They would demand that the plaintiff explain why the
court must act and hear the defendant on the difficulties posed. The
law was thus rooted in society's vision of justice rather than that of
the judge. It unfolded case by case rather than by sweeping
generalizations that would apply to people not present and situations
unimagined, thus causing unexpected difficulties.
9
These characteristics that aimed to tune the common law to
prohibit conduct that society deems unjust are lacking in the statutes
with which Congress empowered EPA in the early 1970s. The
statutes told the EPA to disregard society's customs, indeed to change
them. The goals were protection from unhealthy air pollution by the
end of 1970s and complete elimination of water pollution by 1985.10
8 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 41 (1923).
9 See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353,
373 (1978). The common law judges, of course, sometimes fell short of these ideals. Yet, the
common law's mistakes could be corrected by laws made in the legislature. That was acceptable
in the rule of law tradition because a law made by elected legislators also reflects the values of
society. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL
JUSTICE 88-89 (1978).
10 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)
(2000).
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Thirty plus years later, we have yet to achieve these ideals. EPA is
nothing like a common law court charged with enforcing society's
binding customs, or a court charged with enforcing laws of a
legislature accountable to society. It does not resemble the agencies
that Congress created in the era before 1970, to make laws in "the
public interest," or other formulas connoting society's values. EPA's
mandate was to force society to change its values, not to enforce
them.
Society did need to change how it dealt with the environment, but
the great environmental champion and sage, Aldo Leopold, would
have started by persuasion.l' Society had already been changing and
making laws to match. Pollution had been slowly coming under
control from the beginning of the twentieth century.' 2 The spirit of
1970, however, demanded faster change.
An ideal such as perfectly healthy air by a deadline becomes real
only when enforceable laws require people to reduce pollution to the
required extent. It turned out that no one in public office was willing
to back EPA in taking the kinds of actions needed to achieve that
ideal. 13
Yet, Congress had made achieving such ideals a right held by
every citizen. It is no good saying there is time enough for Congress
to face the hard choices after the ideal is a legal right. Once
government grants a right, such as to healthy air, those who hold it
dear understandably feel entitled to it and so will fight even harder to
keep it than they would have fought to get it in the first place. By
turning ideals into rights, Congress evades the procedural checks in
the Constitution on making rash laws, but those checks come fully
into play if one wants to revise rash laws made by EPA. And, once
Congress legislates a new ideal, a coterie of interest groups grows up
to defend it.
The upshot is that EPA, as Congress has instituted it, necessarily
perverts the rule of law. While the rule of law seeks to proscribe
conduct that society deems unjust, EPA's laws are based on whatever
is expedient to serve its statutorily mandated goals. While common
law judges have no stake in how they define the law, EPA does have
a stake because the stricter the environmental goals, the greater its
power. While the common law judges are forced to consider practical
11 DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON: How
CONGRESS GRABS POWER, SHIRKS RESPONSIBILITY, AND SHORTCHANGES THE PEOPLE, ch. 12,
19 (2005) [hereinafter SAVING OuR ENvIRoNMENT] (describing the work of environmentalist
Aldo Leopold to educate people to take care of the environment in the mid-20th century).
12 Id. at ch. 5.
13 Id.
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consequences because they make the law case by case in the context
of concrete facts presented by those directly affected, EPA makes
laws applicable to society at large. 14 Should EPA hesitate, a citizen
can haul it into court and get an order forcing it to proceed.
In areas other than environmental law, Congress and agencies also
announce laws that apply generally rather than case-by-case, but with
EPA there is a difference. Legislators must consider the public
consequences of the laws they make or suffer personal consequences
themselves because they are responsible. Agencies that came before it
were told to consider practicalities. EPA was to give short shrift to
practicalities.15
I have in earlier writings expressed doubts about whether the
common law could be used as the first line of defense against most
pollution problems, 16 but argued that Congress could take a different
tack in pollution control legislation that would give it more of the
'1 See Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons for Environmental Law from the American
Codification Debate, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE
STATUTORY BASIS FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 130, 130-157, (Roger E. Meiners &
Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2000).
13 Under many statutory provisions, such as those for setting ambient air standards, EPA
is barred from considering the practicalities. See, e.g., Lead Industries Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d
1130, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Under others, it may consider practicalities, but only in a limited
fashion and up against the legislative judgment that society really ought to be attaining the
statutory ideal. For example, the Safe Drinking Water Act's four-step process gave only a
grudging nod to practicality. Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 99-339, 100 Stat. 642
§ 101(b)(D)(4) (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j(26)). After deciding how
much of a dangerous substance in water is safe, EPA is to decide whether it is feasible---that is,
possible-to achieve that safe level. Possible, however, does mean not practical. It may be
possible to sanitize a city's sidewalks with an antiseptic every night, but it is not practical. EPA
is also to calculate the costs and benefits of various limits on the dangerous substance. Here,
Congress permitted EPA to consider practicalities, but did not lend its authority to actually
taking them into account in making the law. If EPA sets the law anywhere short of the lowest
feasible level, it would have to be on EPA's moral authority and it better have an overwhelming
case for exposing the public to any risk that could feasibly be stopped.
That sounds pretty close to ideal, but consider the consequences in the case of arsenic.
EPA got handed the arsenic question in 1974. Twelve years earlier the Public Health Service
had suggested the standard probably should be set at 10 ppb. Yet, in pursuit of something pretty
close to the ideal, EPA left the standard at 50 ppb until 2001. The EPA set the National Interim
Primary Drinking Water Regulation at 50 ppb on December 24, 1975. National Interim Primary
Drinking Water Regulation, 40 Fed. Reg. 59566, 59570 (1975). For the 2001 regulation, see,
National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and
New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976 (2001). Meanwhile, in 1993, the
World Health Organization had adopted a standard of 10 ppb. The EPA was also told, in 1999,
by the National Academy of Sciences that it should revise the arsenic standard "as promptly as
possible." NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER
16 (2001). If 10 ppb made so much sense to Congress and EPA in 2001, they should have
lowered the limit sooner. See generally SAVING OUR ENVIORNMENT, supra note 11, ch. 17.
16 David Schoenbrod, Protecting the Environment in the Spirit of the Common Law, in
THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR
MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3 (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss, eds., 1999); David
Schoenbrod, Putting the "Law" Back into Environmental Law, 22 REGULATION 17 (1999).
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virtues of the common law-chiefly by leaving more, but not all,
power to states and localities and, when it wants to act federally,
taking direct responsibility for the regulations rather than delegating it
to the EPA.17 I will not replay these contentions here, but rather turn
to the main contributions to this symposium to see whether they allay
my skepticism (not cynicism) about whether the common law can
replace regulatory law in environmental protection.
The four principle contributors to this symposium have viewed the
common law's potential to protect the environment from quite
different perspectives. Steven J. Eagle, focusing on the idea that the
common law protects liberty by defending settled expectations,
concludes that the common law is superior to administrative law in
reconciling environmental protection with other interests. 8 Keith N.
Hylton, focusing on welfare economics, concludes that the common
law, with a little help from administrative agencies, will produce
more efficient environmental policy than agencies alone. 9 J. B. Ruhl,
focusing on ecosystem services, concludes that the best way to
increase protection for them is to combine common law nuisance with
administrative law.2 °  Stuart Buck, focusing on comparative
institutional analysis, concludes that he can reach no conclusion on
the relative merits of the common law and administrative law.2'
The task assigned to me is to reflect on the work of these four
contributors. Although my perspective differs from theirs, their essays
are each thoughtful and clearly stated. That has made my work light.
PROFESSOR STEVEN EAGLE
Eagle begins his argument that the common law should supplant
administrative law in environmental protection with Justice Lemuel
Shaw's description of common law as "a few broad and
comprehensive principles, founded on reason, natural justice, and
enlightened public policy, modified and adapted to the circumstances
of all the particular cases which fall within it."'22 The notion that the
common law is based upon a few stable principles is critical to
Eagle's essential claim that the common law can protect expectations
"7 SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT, supra note 8, at ch. 18.
18 Steven J. Eagle, The Common Law and the Environment, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 583
(2008).
19 Keith N. Hylton, The Economic Theory of Nuisance Law and Implications for
Environmental Regulation, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673 (2008).
20 J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV.753 (2008).
21 Stuart Buck, The Common Law and the Environment in the Courts, 58 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 621 (2008).
22 Eagle, supra note 18, at 583 (quoting Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine R.R., 67
Mass. 263, 267 (1854).
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even while adapting to new circumstances. As he writes, "[t]he utility
of the common law lies in its basic adherence to settled expectations
about rights." 23 This means, he argues, that common law can protect
liberty and produce a healthy environment and a healthy society,
while the administrative state cannot because it has no clear idea of its
objectives 24 and is liable to be hijacked for the purpose of wealth
redistribution.25
Yet, even back in 1854, when Justice Shaw was writing, many
losing litigants must surely have thought that the judges were making
it up as they went along rather than protecting settled expectations.
There have been many changes in the common law since then.
Eagle makes no systematic effort to show that the common law
can deal with modem environmental problems in a way that protects
settled expectations. He does point out that some cases are brought
and disposed of, 26 but that does not add up to a showing that courts
can and do dispose of such cases in line with settled expectations.
The common law could dispose of modem environmental claims
on the basis of settled expectations if it upheld land uses that are
customary and forbad others. But, the main engine of the common
law in environmental protection is nuisance. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts instructs that "an intentional invasion of another's
interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable if ... the
gravity of the harm [to the plaintiff] outweighs the utility of the
[defendant's] conduct., 27 The Restatement goes on to define "the
gravity of the harm" to the plaintiff and "the utility of the ... conduct"
[to the defendant] in terms that reflect not only what is customary.
"The gravity of the harm" to the plaintiff includes not "the suitability
of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the character of the
locality", but also many other factors, including the extent and
character of the harm to the plaintiff and society. Similarly, "the
utility of the . . .conduct" [to the defendant] includes not only "the
suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality" but also
many other factors including the extent and character of the benefit of
defendant's conduct to the defendant and society.
28
Thus, what is a nuisance hangs on an amorphous balancing and the
balance struck on any particular varies with the land use pattern and
the place. It also varies over time. Uses that once were not customary
23 Id. at 614.
24 Id. at Part II.
21 Id. at 606.
26 Id. at 614.
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1979).
2. Id
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have become common as the economy develops and uses that were
once customary become unacceptable as their scale grows to the point
where they impose severe costs on neighbors. 29 How the balance is
struck also varies from judge to judge and jury to jury because how
the nuisance test comes out depends on factors that people will value
differently. So nuisance law has been long thought to be notoriously
uncertain, an "impenetrable jungle. 3 °
The flux and variation in nuisance is apt to be particularly great in
modem environmental cases because neighborhood land uses now
change more rapidly than they did in customary societies, the public's
attitudes about environmental issues has changed radically in recent
decades, science keeps producing new information on environmental
consequences, 31 and individuals differ sharply in the values they
perceive and value those consequences.
The common law is even more uncertain than this thumbnail
discussion of the Restatement's treatment of private intentional
nuisance suggests. As Ruhl points out, Restatement section 826A
takes a defendant-centered approach to nuisance, but some
jurisdictions take a plaintiff-centered approach under which severe
cost to plaintiff constitutes a nuisance even if the nuisance produces a
large benefit. 32 As Stuart Buck points out, courts sometimes deal with
pollution under trespass doctrine. Trespass law is tougher on
defendants because it bans all trespasses, regardless of the relative
impact on plaintiffs, defendants, and society.3 3 As he points out,
trespass traditionally dealt with visible invasions, leaving the invisible
ones to nuisance, yet the dividing line has in some cases yielded to
the idea that the sufficiently severe harm is a trespass, even if
invisible.34 In addition, strict liability under section 520 of the
Restatement rolls out another vacuous balancing test for "abnormally
dangerous" activities.
35
Eagle states in conclusion that "[t]he genius of the common law is
the fact that it combines the protection of expectations with the
possibility of incremental change. 36 Here he does acknowledge the
29 Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 108 Ariz. 178 (1972) is a case
where what was not a nuisance became one as residences were built nearby. Similarly, while a
feedlot with one steer might not be a nuisance, it could well become one if the herd grows large
enough.
30 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 63 (4th ed. 1971) at 571.
3' Ruh], supra note 20, at Part II.
32 Id. at 766 n.44, 45. As Ruhl points out, the Restatement gives some scope to this
approach in § 826B.
33 Buck, supra note 21, at 626.
3 Id.
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
36 Eagle, supra note 18, at 620.
2008]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
flux in the law of nuisance, but he does not show the flux would be
only "incremental." Nor does he show that the flux, together with the
variations from decision to decision, are consistent with settled
expectations.
Of course, administrative law also has its share of tests that are
vacuous or agencies change their regulations and how they interpret
and enforce them with changes in the political winds blow. Whether a
common law or administrative law approach would do more to
unsettle expectations, I do not know. But, showing it would be so is
essential to making the case that the common law protects settled
expectations.
PROFESSOR KEITH HYLTON
Hylton begins by distinguishing "command and control rules" and
"liability rule[s]." 37 The distinction is akin to, if not the same as,
Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed's distinction between
property rules and liabilities rules in their article, "Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral. 38
Property rules (akin to command and control rules) order the
defendant while liability rules make the defendant liable in damages.
Hylton also distinguishes between private and public enforcement.
This, writes Hylton, produces "four regime types: public enforcement
with command-and-control rules, public enforcement with liability
rules, private enforcement with command-and-control rules, and
private enforcement with liability rules."
39
Hylton analyzes these four approaches, but primarily the first,
third, and fourth, with a view to finding which is most likely to
produce a desirable level of environmental protection from the
perspective of micro-economics. Noting that activities that produce
external costs can also produce externals benefits, he concludes that,
where the defendant has not been negligent, the way for the law to
achieve efficiency is to intervene only when "the external costs of the
actor's activity substantially exceed the external benefits associated
with the actor's activity. 4°
Hylton argues that the common law deploys such a test under both
the law of abnormally dangerous activities and the law of nuisance.
37 Hylton, supra note 19, 673. (emphasis omitted).
38 Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-10 (1972)
39 Hylton, supra note 19, 674.
40 Id. at 681. (emphasis omitted).
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So Hylton sees in the common law tests that focus on costs and
benefits while Eagle sees tests that focus on settled expectations.
Like Eagle, however, Hylton has only part of the picture. Take, for
example, the law of abnormally dangerous activities, which he
analyzes through the lens of the Restatement section 520's six factors:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the
person, land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable
care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common
usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is
carried on and;
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed
by its dangerous attributes.
The first three factors and the sixth nicely fit his cost and benefits
interpretation. The fourth factor, "extent to which the activity is not a
matter of common usage," he plausibly makes fit by arguing that it
"helps us identify activities for which the risks are reciprocal to those
of other common activities., 41 It makes sense to think that the
reciprocal nature of risks is relevant to whether it is efficient to curb
the activity of a particular defendant. The fifth factor is where the
trouble comes. He writes "inappropriateness, is another way of
determining whether the activity imposes a reciprocated risk., 42 Yet,
inappropriateness also refers to whether the use interferes with settled
expectations or, in other words, fairness as opposed to efficiency.43
Hylton's analysis of the private nuisance under Restatement
section 826A is also troubling. Its definition of nuisance-to repeat,
that "an intentional invasion of another's interest in the use and
enjoyment of land is unreasonable if . . . the gravity of the harm
outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct," is, according to Hylton,
41 Id. at 683.
42 Id.
43 But cf Hylton, supra note 19, 683. According a draft of the Restatement, "The appeal
of strict liability for an activity is stronger when its risks are imposed on third parties while its
benefits are concentrated among a few." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §20, cmt. J.
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"questionable because it refers to the actor's conduct rather than his
activity." In other words, he seems to believe the test is keyed to
whether the defendant was sufficiently careful in undertaking the
activity rather than whether the activity, if properly done, was
suitable. The Restatement's wording could have been better, but its
intention was to evaluate the activity rather than whether it was
negligently performed.44
Having found the Restatement wanting, Hylton concludes that
"[t]he core question is whether the actor's activity is one that imposes
too many risks on others given its benefits. 45 In other words, he
makes the law of nuisance into a cost-benefit test. Yet, a pigsty in a
neighborhood of parlors is still a nuisance even though the pigsty
produces very valuable pork.
Hylton argues that cost-benefit is the lodestar not only at the
liability stage, but also at the remedy stage. He concludes that a court
will not enjoin a defendant liable for nuisance if the injunction would
impose costs that are greater than its benefits. 46 He is referring to the
undue hardship defense, but that defense differs from Buck's
description for many reasons. In ruling on that defense, courts
consider not only costs and benefits, but also the equities of the case.
For example, courts discount the hardship to the defendant if it is self-
imposed and discount the benefit to the plaintiffs if they were slow to
invoke their rights.47 That is why the test is sometimes referred to as
the "balance of equities and hardship" test. 48 Moreover, it is not
enough that the hardship caused by the injunction is greater than the
benefits to the plaintiff, as a pure cost-benefit approach would
require, but the hardship must be, to use Douglas Laycock's phrase
"substantially disproportionate. 49  In sum, the undue hardship
defense, like the law nuisance, hangs not just on efficiency, but also
on fairness.
Besides, making the undue hardship defense into a cost-benefit
analysis can have adverse implications for economic welfare. This
may seem counter-intuitive, but the Calabresi and Melamed article
44 See Hylton, supra note 19, at 684-686.
4' Hylton, supra note 19, at 685.
46 Id. at 686-689. The leading Property casebook, Dukemier, Krier etc. makes the point
that few courts explicitly follow the Restatement. DUKEMINIER, KRIER, ALEXANDER, SCHILL,
PROPERTY 642 (6th ed.).
47 LEVINE, JUNG, SCHOENBROD & MACBETH, REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 100-07
(4th ed. 2006). See also Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 688, 749-50 (1990).
48 See Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 F.2d 736, 737-38 (2d Cir. 1927).
49 LEVINE ET AL., supra note 47, at 97. See also David Schoenbrod, The Measure of an
Injunction: A Principle to Replace Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN.
L. REV. 627 (1989).
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explains why. When the law protects an entitlement with a liability
rule, the judge sets the price at which its owner must sell it, but when
the law protects an entitlement with a property rule, the owner of the
entitlement gets to set the price or to refuse to sell altogether. The
reason for property rules, argue Calabresi and Melamed, is that
owners know better than judges what their entitlements are worth to
them and so it is efficient, at least where the transaction costs are not
too high, to have the owners of entitlements price them because they
have much better information than do judges.5° In other words, the
justification for property rules is that it is more efficient in the long
run to allocate resources through markets rather than through pricing
51by courts.
The damage remedy in common law environmental cases is also a
poor vessel for achieving efficiency in the cost-benefit sense. The
certainty requirement bars damages unless the plaintiff can show with
a fairly high level of certainty that the nuisance caused the purported
elements of injury.52 That means that a plaintiff exposed to a nuisance
that will increase the chance of getting a certain kind of cancer by,
say, somewhere between 0.1 and 30 percent, is unlikely to recover
any damages for the increased risk, even if this sort of cancer
develops, because it is more likely than not that the plaintiff would
have gotten cancer anyway. In other cases, juries may award damages
that are wildly high.
Even if the common law sought to decide questions of liability and
remedy on the basis of cost benefit analysis, there is reason to doubt
such a common law would maximize benefits. One reason, which
Hylton addresses, is that there are free-rider problems in identifying
environmental harms and their source.53 He would have the
government help by providing information to potential plaintiffs. 54
There are, however, other reasons why a common law geared to cost
benefit analysis would fall well short of efficiency. One reason is
Buck's point that plaintiffs' lawyers in deciding which cases to bring
to maximize their income are apt to do a poor job of prioritizing risks
to the public at large.55 Another reason is that cost-benefit analyses in
the environmental field are highly uncertain because of lack of
information on costs and benefits and disagreements about how to
value the costs and benefits. It is not unusual for plausible estimates
SO Calabresi & Malamed, supra note 38, at 1107.
51 Id.
52 See Ayers v. Jackson Twp., 525 A.2d 287, 311 (N.J. 1987).
53 Hylton, supra note 19, at 694-695.
5 Id. at 695-696.
55 Buck, supra note 21, at 644-646.
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of costs and benefits to vary over wide ranges, thus making it
indeterminate whether the costs exceed the benefits vice versa.56 The
uncertainty in cost-benefit analysis would be compounded when they
are constructed by judges and juries rather than policy analysts.
So, whether the common law is about cost-benefit or much more,
it will often be difficult to predict outcomes. If the outcomes under
the common law are more unpredictable than under the present
regime, then that will be another source of inefficiency. The
unpredictability will discourage investments and encourage in the
environmental sphere the equivalent of wasteful, indeed often
harmful, defensive medicine in response to unpredictable malpractice
litigation. Studies do show that doctors make many more negligent errors
than they are sued for, 7 but the unpredictability of its liability makes for
wasteful defensive medicine.
58
Of course, administrative law as we have it, itself is often
inefficient in protecting the environment.59 Whether a common law or
administrative law approach would be more inefficient, I do not
know. But, showing it would be so is essential to making the case that
the common law produces efficiency.
PROFESSOR J. B. RUHL
Ruhl argues that the common law could be a useful adjunct to
administrative law in protecting ecosystem services. 60 He presents a
strong argument that courts could recognize damage to eco-system
services as a nuisance, and on occasion have done so. 61 He is looking
to common law nuisance to supplement rather than replace
administrative law in protecting eco-system services. This, he argues,
would be useful because nuisance law would help shield regulations
from takings claims and lend political legitimacy to such regulation.62
Unlike Eagle, Ruhl does not argue that nuisance law would protect
settled expectations. Indeed, he wants nuisance law to change in
response to new information about the importance of eco-system
services. Unlike Hylton, Ruhl does not argue that nuisance law
produces efficiency. Ruhl's normative foundation is much more basic
56 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 165-66
(2004).
57 See TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005).
58 See PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMON GOOD: HOW AMERICA'S
LAWSUIT CULTURE UNDERMINES OUR FREEDOM (2002).
59 E.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION (2006).
60 Ruh], supra note 20, at 762-765.
61 Id. at 765-770.
62 Id.
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and limited to the eco-system services. He wants more protection for
them and sees nuisance law as one way to get it.
Ruhl's wanting more protection for eco-system services raises the
question; how much more? Ruhl does not argue, "the more, the
better." He knows lines must be drawn. He likes that courts can
decide on a highly localized basis.63 Thus, Ruhl does not have a
cosmic theory, but rather a desire and acknowledges that whether the
courts will satisfy it through nuisance depends on a balancing act.
64
He is, in short, alert to the uncertainty in the application of
nuisance doctrine. The uncertainty is, however, somewhat greater
than even he acknowledges. He argues convincingly that one of the
factors in assessing the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff test under
the Restatement, "the character of the harm," is no bar to recognizing
damage to eco-system services as a nuisance, but he does not grapple
65with the difficulty for courts of applying that factor. For example,
while a court might readily decide that flooding on plaintiffs'
property caused by defendant's damage to a wetland constitutes is a
harm of a very bad character, what is the court going to make of bird-
loving plaintiffs having fewer birds on their property because
defendants changed the crops they were growing? Is this a "harm" or
the loss of a benefit? Ruhl's version of nuisance law for ecosystem
protection makes no distinction between requiring defendants to
confer a benefit and preventing defendants from imposing a harm.
Yet, according to Prosser, "the highly individualistic philosophy of
the older common law had no great difficulty in working out
restraints upon the commission of affirmative acts of harm, but shrank
from converting the courts into an agency for forcing men to help one
another." 66 He goes on to acknowledge that the law of torts does
impose affirmative duties to do good in some circumstances, but
where that would be when it comes to eco-systems services may be
hard to say.
67
Ruhl attempts to cabin the uncertainty by noting the concept of
"critical natural capital. 68 Surely, this is a sensible concept for
ecologists but its application in court would ride on questions of
degree such as how important is an ecosystem and to what extent are
substitutes available.
63 Id at 768-69.
6 Id.
65 Id. at 777-779.
6 See W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 373-4 (5th Ed. 1984)
67 id.
N Ruhl, supra note 20, at 774 (emphasis omitted).
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Ruhl also attempts to ameliorate the uncertainty in nuisance law by
emphasizing anticipatory remedies. 69 But, once the ecosystem
services nuisance cat is let out of the bag, plaintiffs will seek to enjoin
not only projects not yet begun, but the operation of projects already
completed at some cost and to get damages for harm already suffered.
PROFESSOR STUART BUCK
Buck starts by arguing that we lack empirical data to compare the
performance of common law and administrative law in protecting the
environment, and probably always will.70 He then compares the
institutional capacity of the common law and administrative law to
deal with environmental claims and finds shortcomings in both.7'
Thus, he is agnostic on which can do a better job.72 That is, with the
exception of "'diffuse, low-probability, multi-lateral, and temporally-
remote harms,' such as global warming. ' 73
I have drawn on Buck's work throughout this little essay. I like
that he thinks about the potential of the common law in terms of
particular aspects of environmental protection rather than trying to
reach conclusions about the potential of common law for
environmental protection in general. A more particularized approach
may well conclude that some areas should be handled by
administrative law alone, others by the common law alone, and still
others by a combination, as Ruhl concludes as to ecosystem services.
CONCLUSION
A particularized approach is useful not only because the relative
institutional competency of common law and administrative
competency varies with the context-compare a rural pond bounded
by three owners to global warming-but also because of political
question concerns.
By political concerns, I mean not only whether there is judicially
manageable test 74 (which I have been discussing under the heading of
uncertainty), but also whether the case involves the sort of policy
issue better left to the political process. The distinction is illustrated
by the first case I filed as an environmental advocate back in 1972.
61 Id. at 777-779.
70 Buck, supra note 21, at 630-633.
71 Id. at 630-646.
7 Id. at 646.
73 Id., quoting Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 331 (1985).
14 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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The claim was that noise levels on the New York City subway were
so loud as to constitute a nuisance. The New York Court of Appeals
rejected the case on the basis that administrating the subways was a
job for the political process rather than the courts.75 At the time, I
thought the decision was wrong because the political process through
the Occupational Health and Safety Administration had given the
courts a judicially manageable standard by establishing numerical
limits on noise exposure and the subways exceeded those limits.
There was no private cause of action under the occupational laws, but
that is where the nuisance claim came in. In retrospect, however, I
think the court's decision was correct. Yes, the subways did exceed
the noise limits, but the subways had a myriad of other problems and
not enough money. The politicians in New York had delegated how
to allocate the scarce dollars to a public authority rather than the
courts. The courts could not have tackled the subway noise issue
without superseding the public authority's discretionary functions.
Meanwhile, my lead plaintiff in the subway noise case became the
attorney general in New York State, where he certainly could have
filed a subway noise suit in his official capacity, though he did not do
so. Yet, the subways are much quieter today because of the political
process. The subway noise litigation was the forerunner of a larger
campaign to improve transit in New York City, including a citizen
suit brought under the Clean Air Act.76 Here then is another
variable-whether the political process has authorized court
involvement through an explicit citizen suit provision. In that case,
the district court judge ruled that he could not issue an order because
this was a political matter, but the federal court of appeal reversed
because Congress had commanded the courts to act. Even there,
change came not from any court order, but from the political process,
as it responded to growing public pressure. 77
The point of this little war story, indeed of this entire essay, is that
the most productive way to think about the potential of the common
law in the environmental sphere is in particular areas.
75 Abrams v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 355 N.E.2d 289 (N.Y. 1976). See also Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E. 2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970), and Connecticut v. American Electric
Power Co., 406 F.Supp.2d 265, 267, 271-275 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), both declining to enjoin
environmental harms on the basis that political branches should make the decision.
76 Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1977) and Beame v. Friends of the
Earth, 434 U.S. 1310 (1977).
77 See Ross SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS
WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 35-43 (2003).
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